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Revolutionary Syndicalist Opposition to the First World War: 
A Comparative Reassessment 
 
 
It has been argued that support for the First World War by the important French 
syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) has tended to 
obscure the fact that other national syndicalist organisations remained faithful to 
their professed workers’ internationalism: on this basis syndicalists beyond France, 
more than any other ideological persuasion within the organised trade union 
movement in immediate pre-war and wartime Europe, can be seen to have 
constituted an authentic movement of opposition to the war in their refusal to 
subordinate class interests to those of the state, to endorse policies of ‘defencism’ 
and to abandon the rhetoric of class conflict. This article, which attempts to 
contribute to a much neglected comparative historiography of the international 
syndicalist movement, re-evaluates the syndicalist response across a broad 
geographical field of canvas (embracing France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Britain and 
America) to reveal a rather more nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture. While it 
highlights the distinctive nature of the syndicalist response compared with other 
labour movement trends, it also explores the important strategic and tactical 
limitations involved, including the dilemma of attempting to translate formal 
syndicalist ideological commitments against the war into practical measures of 
intervention, and the consequences of the syndicalists’ subordination of the political 
question of the war to the industrial struggle. 
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Introduction 
 
In an important recent contribution to our understanding of the organised trade 
union movement’s response to the First World War, Wayne Thorpe has argued that 
European revolutionary syndicalist organisations (to use the very broad term for a 
number of different but related revolutionary union movements that were also known 
variously as ‘industrial unionist’ and ‘anarcho-syndicalist’), viewed internationally, 
were unique in not supporting the imperialist ventures of their respective 
governments. Evidence is provided to suggest that support for the war by the 
important French syndicalist organisation, the Confédération Générale du Travail 
(CGT), has obscured the fact that five other national syndicalist organisations – in 
belligerent Germany and Italy, and in neutral Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands – 
remained faithful to their professed workers’ internationalism. On this basis, it is 
argued, syndicalists beyond France, more than any other ideological persuasion 
within the organised trade union movement in immediate pre-war and wartime 
Europe, can be seen to have constituted an authentic movement of opposition to the 
war, refusing to subordinate class interests to those of the state, to endorse policies 
of ‘defencism’, or to abandon the rhetoric of class conflict.1
 
   
The substantive thrust of Thorpe’s argument is undeniable. Indeed, it was not 
only the great majority of the official leadership of the trade union movement that 
rallied to the national cause. Practically all the leaders of the Second International 
(the collective voice of the world’s socialist parties representing 3 million workers in 
27 different parties), renounced their prior internationalist pledges and rushed to 
support their respective governments’ war drive. This was despite repeated pledges 
that, in the event of war, social democratic parties would ‘do all in their power to 
utilise the economic and political crisis created by the war to arouse the population 
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and to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule’.2
 
 When in August 1914 the 
German Social Democratic Party (the main organisation of the Second International) 
voted in the Reichstag for war credits demanded by the government, its attitude was 
shared by virtually all other major parties of the International. By contrast, 
revolutionary syndicalists generally took a strong position of opposition to the war on 
the basis that it was purely a conflict of capitalist interests quite unrelated to the 
interests of the working class; a conflict, however, in which the working class would 
be the major victim, sent into senseless slaughter to help line the pockets of the 
owners of industry.  
Thorpe makes an important contribution by attempting to document the way 
in which within the organised trade union movement, measured internationally, an 
ideological variable may be said to have determined the response to war in 1914 - 
one which divided syndicalist trade unions from those of every other trend. In 
stressing this point, Thorpe reinforces the broader historical interpretation of events 
which has been portrayed by contemporary anarcho-syndicalist scholars and 
activists. As one British author has written: ‘In contrast to the Marxists of the Second 
International, revolutionary syndicalism survived the outbreak of war with its 
revolutionary credentials intact – the CGT was alone in declaring its support for 
war’.3
 
 
However, notwithstanding the apparent distinctive nature of the syndicalist 
response to the First World War, Thorpe also acknowledged, although he did not 
emphasise, important qualifications to this stance in certain national contexts - 
notably the collapse into patriotism of the CGT in France (unquestionably the most 
important syndicalist organisation in Europe) and the pro-war ‘interventionist’ 
minority inside the Italian syndicalist movement. Moreover, Thorpe’s study, which 
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provided an essentially broad-brush stroke comparative overview, did not explore 
other ambiguities and limitations in syndicalist strategy and tactics more generally, 
in particular the tensions involved in attempting to translate formal syndicalist 
ideological commitments against the war into practical measures of intervention 
inside the working class movement, and the consequences of the syndicalists’ 
subordination of political issues to the industrial struggle.4
 
 
In an attempt to build on and extend Thorpe’s pioneering contribution, so as 
to explore both the strengths as well as the limitations of the syndicalist stance 
towards the First World War, this article presents a much more disaggregated picture 
with a different and broader geographical field of canvas for study. Thus, as well as 
re-evaluating (and providing new evidence on) the syndicalist response in countries 
such as France, Italy and Spain that Thorpe’s work comments on, there is also 
consideration of other syndicalist or syndicalist-inclined movements in Ireland, 
Britain and America that he omitted.5
 
 In the process, the study reveals a rather 
more nuanced, ambiguous and uneven picture of the syndicalist movement to the 
one presented by Thorpe.  
The research, which attempts to contribute to a much neglected comparative 
historiography of the international syndicalist movement, draws primarily on two 
sources: a very extensive range of existing secondary literature, including single-
country studies on different labour and syndicalist movements as well as (where 
available) comparative overviews on the countries concerned; and a variety of 
primary sources, including the writings of syndicalists (and other contemporary 
commentators) contained in numerous newspapers, pamphlets, books and other 
archival material.6
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To begin with the article looks at the opposition to war mounted by the 
syndicalists in Spain and Ireland, as well as their varying organisational fortunes 
amidst the relatively favourable context within which they operated. It then contrasts 
this experience with the internal schisms that afflicted the syndicalist movements in 
belligerent France and Italy, where large segments collapsed into nationalism. The 
article proceeds to make a further contrast with the movements in America and 
Britain, exploring the significance of the syndicalists’ ‘anti-political’ stance for their 
opposition to war.  
 
 
Spain and Ireland: anti-war stance, broader beneficiaries 
 
In Spain undoubtedly the clearest and most consistent internationalist opposition 
towards the First World War within the organised labour movement came from the 
syndicalists in the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT), although this occurred 
within the relatively favourable context of the Spanish government remaining neutral 
in the conflict between the Central and Allied Powers.7 The Socialist Party gradually 
abandoned the pacifist internationalism that had previously led them to condemn 
Spain’s colonial adventure in Morocco, and moved towards an overtly pro-Allied 
interventionist position. By contrast, the CNT professed to see only an equality of 
war guilt among the aggressor ruling classes, insisting it was of no concern to 
Spanish workers which side won, and demanding Spain’s absolute neutrality in the 
war. Jóse Negre, the first secretary of the CNT, even went so far as to declare: ‘Let 
Germany win, let France win, it is all the same to the workers, who will continue to 
be exploited and tyrannised just as before the war, and probably more than before’.8 
“Whether one ship or a hundred ships be sunk”, commented the confederation’s 
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paper Solidaridad Obrera, ‘we do not want war’. It would be far more sensible to use 
their weapons against ‘more immediate enemies’.9
 
  
When the heavily anarcho-syndicalist inclined CNT discovered a number of 
outstanding international anarchist leaders (including Peter Kropotkin) had issued a 
Manifesto of the Sixteen in February 1916 declaring support for the Allied cause 
(which was backed by a small number of important Spanish anarchists), they angrily 
repudiated them. ‘Rather than war – revolution!’, cried the Ateneo Sindicalista of 
Barcelona in a manifesto written by Antonio Loredo and signed by hundreds of 
organisations.10
 
 The only real dissenters from this antiwar orthodoxy were some 
militants in Galicia and Asturias. These ‘minoritarians’ were heatedly denounced by 
the majority of the Catalonian anarcho-syndicalists, and the violent anti-war 
polemics of Solidaridad Obrera (and the anarchist Tierra y Libertad) easily prevailed 
within the CNT. For example, on 1 April 1915 Solidaridad Obrera published a very 
significant statement against the war, entitled Manifesto Internacional. In August 
1916 an editorial in the paper criticised the attitude of those in favour of intervening 
in the war in the name of liberty or democracy. 
The present war is no different from any of the other wars that have bloodied the 
world; its causes and its ends are identical to those of previous wars. Industrial and 
commercial prevalence is what is being revealed here… 
 
What is so regrettable is that, deceived by the tendentious campaign of the belligerent 
press, a host of sincere militants, instead of preparing for the revolutionary general 
strike, put their packsacks on their backs, thinking that they really were going to the 
trenches to defend Liberty and Justice.11
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Despite the fact the CNT (who had only just emerged from a period of 
illegality) were in disarray at the beginning of the war with barely 15,000 members, 
they were able to expand to 30,000 by the early part of 1915, and in March 1916 
Solidaridad Obrera appeared as a daily.12
 
 Their internationalism, albeit essentially 
propagandist in nature, undoubtedly proved attractive to a layer of the most militant 
workers, but the fact that Spain was not itself plunged into participation in the war 
also meant the hostile pressures on the CNT were much less severe than in 
belligerent countries. Moreover, a crucial contributory factor to the organisation’s 
expanding membership (and of that of the socialist-led union confederation the 
Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) was mounting working class opposition to food 
shortages and speculation arising from the war, which fused into underlying 
discontent with the political regime. The CNT’s syndicalist commitment to destroying 
capitalism through direct action and revolutionary industrial struggle meant they 
were well placed to intervene to take advantage of the situation.  
Ironically, despite traditional rivalry with the Socialist Party, now further 
embittered by their opposing stances on the war, rank-and-file pressure for co-
operation between the CNT and the much larger UGT led eventually in July 1916 to 
the Pact of Saragossa. This resulted in a manifesto proclaiming agreement to work 
together to force the government to take action on the question of living costs and 
suggested a general strike as chief means of exerting pressure. Under the terms of 
the new accord, joint meetings were held in various cities and Spain’s first nationally 
co-ordinated 24-hour general strike took place in December 1916. Yet while the total 
number of strikers exceeded the combined membership of the two participating 
labour confederations, the protest made little impact on the government. 
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In 1917 political corruption, economic crisis, Catalan regionalism, 
dissatisfaction in the army, the international context – notably the inspiration of the 
February Russian revolution - and a resurgent workers’ movement combined to 
produce a near revolutionary situation in Spain. A movement for liberalisation 
culminated in a national assembly of republican and Catalan deputies in Barcelona in 
July. The socialists, who were particularly keen to see the establishment of a republic 
as the first stage of the ‘bourgeois revolution’ prevailed on the CNT to organise 
jointly a revolutionary general strike. But the government, foreseeing the danger, 
provoked it before it was properly organised, and although the strike spread over 
large parts of Spain it was met with fierce repression, particularly in Barcelona where 
12,000 troops were concentrated and a state of war proclaimed (leaving 70 dead, 
hundreds wounded and thousands arrested). This saw an early end to CGT-UGT 
collaboration, with the UGT viewing the debacle as proof of the incorrectness of the 
syndicalist general strike tactic, while the CNT viewed the socialists’ inadequate 
tactics and the lack of support from bourgeois republicans as proof of the 
uselessness of collaboration with ‘political’ organisations.  
 
Even so, the CNT suffered no great setback from the outcome of the strike. In 
fact, news of the October 1917 Russian Revolution sparked off a three year period of 
unprecedented unrest across the country (Trienio Bolchevista, ‘Three Bolshevik 
Years’), with a series of local general strikes and semi-insurrectionary movements 
which spectacularly helped to further boost CNT membership to 80,500 by the end of 
the war (and to 790,000 by December 1919 in the immediate post-war period, 
although by 1923 this had been reduced to a quarter of a million).13
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Meanwhile, in Ireland on the outbreak of war, the main forces of the labour 
movement formally aligned themselves against imperialism, with the Irish Trades 
Union Congress declaring that a ‘European war for aggrandisement of the capitalistic 
class has been declared’ and demanding the retention of foodstuffs in Ireland. 
Similarly, Jim Larkin’s syndicalist-inspired Irish Transport and General Workers Union 
(ITGWU) responded with a ferocious editorial in the Irish Worker: ‘If England wants 
an empire let her hold the empire. What have we to do with her murderous, 
grasping, thieving work…Fight for Ireland…Remember by taking Britain’s side in this 
unholy war you are giving up your claim that Ireland is a nation’.14 It was a war for 
the British Empire and Ireland’s war was at home. Larkin’s advice was to: ‘Stop at 
home. Arm for Ireland. Fight for Ireland and no other land’.15 Even if support for 
such a stance was restricted to a tiny minority in the country as a whole, Larkin 
made anti-war speeches at every opportunity, the ITGWU paper Irish Worker was a 
mélange of anti-war propaganda and the union organised a number of small anti-war 
demonstrations in Dublin.16
 
 
However, with the outbreak of war occurring in the wake of the crushing 
defeat of the union in the Dublin strike and lockout of 1913, the ITGWU was much 
too weak to launch any industrial action in opposition to either the war or its effects. 
Instead, it looked to the republican Irish Volunteer Force, and made a determined 
attempt to capture it from moderate ‘Home Rule’ supporters by bitterly attacking 
those prepared to accept that the price of a proposed Irish parliament with some 
limited autonomy from British colonial control would have to be the partition of 
Ireland between north and south, insisting this outcome would merely consolidate 
and strengthen religious and sectarian divisions. When the Irish Volunteers’ leader 
announced his support for Britain’s war effort and called on his followers to enlist, 
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Larkin asked the readers of the Irish Worker, ‘Is there no man to provide a rope and 
a tree for this twentieth century Judas?’.17
 
  
Larkin left Ireland at the end of October 1914 for what was intended to be a 
short Transport Union fund-raising visit to America, although he was not to return 
until over eight years later. During his supposedly temporary absence the 
revolutionary socialist James Connolly, who had been actively involved with the 
Industrial Workers of the World in America and heavily influenced by syndicalist 
ideas, was appointed acting-general secretary of the union, taking over editorship of 
the Irish Worker and command of the union’s own Citizen Army (armed defence 
force). He issued an appeal for the development of full-scale industrial unionism, for 
small unions catering for general labour to join together with the Transport Union in 
‘One Big Union’.18 And Connolly advocated a general strike across Europe to stop the 
war.19
 
 
But despite the best efforts of Larkin, Connolly and their supporters, and the 
overall context of colonial subjugation, opposition to the war in Ireland was 
overwhelmed by a great surge of pro-British sentiment, such that by 1916 about half 
of the ITGWU’s membership had enlisted in the British Army.20
 
 The devastating 
Dublin defeat, combined with the impact of war, produced a collapse in union 
membership from over 30,000 to about 5,000 members by 1916.  
In response, Connolly sought another route to initiate a revolution, becoming 
one of the main instigators and leaders of the Easter Rising of 1916, an insurrection 
that he believed would link the cause of Irish freedom to the wider international 
battle against imperialism.21 Even though Ireland was a tiny country, Connolly 
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thought it could play a particularly crucial role by striking a blow against the greatest 
empire of the day based in Britain, and in the process set off a chain reaction: 
‘Starting thus, Ireland may yet set the torch to a European conflagration that will not 
burn out until the last throne and last capitalist bond and debenture will be shrivelled 
on the funeral pyre of the last war lord’.22
 
 
But despite being the leader of the ITGWU he did not openly campaign for the 
rising among the membership as a whole. Instead he embraced the politics of 
‘militarism’ and exemplary action by a small but determined minority against British 
rule, as advocated by the radical Irish Republican Brotherhood’s Military Council, with 
whom he now allied the tiny forces of the ITGWU’s Citizen Army to become Dublin 
Commander of the combined forces.23 As a result, the 700 Volunteers and 120 
Citizen Army members who seized control of the centre of Dublin and declared an 
independent Irish Republic did not enjoy popular support and were quickly 
overwhelmed by the British army. Connolly was one of sixteen leaders executed by a 
British firing squad afterwards. Lenin pointed out the tragedy was that the Irish rose 
‘prematurely, when the European revolt of the proletariat had not yet matured’.24
 
 
Indeed they rose before war weariness had seriously gripped significant sections of 
the Irish population.  
Yet following Connolly’s death, the ITGWU, under the leadership of William 
O’Brien, was to experience a remarkable reversal in its fortunes, spectacularly 
increasing its membership to 12,000 by the autumn of 1917 and to over 40,000 by 
1918. On one level it was a recovery in workers’ confidence to strike which provided 
the impetus for this revitalisation of the union - as the economic grievances of 
workers, reflected in a general wage demand movement throughout Ireland, 
 - 12 -  
produced a distinctly syndicalist dynamic. From 1917 onwards the spontaneous re-
adoption of the Larkinite methods used in the Dublin lockout (of the sympathetic 
strike, refusal to touch ‘tainted’ goods or cross picket lines) attained increasing 
coherence as it was complemented by the practical implementation of Connolly’s 
ideas of industrial unionism.  
 
Meanwhile, paradoxically, despite the failure of the 1916 rising, the sheer 
ferocity of the British response had the effect of provoking widespread sympathy 
with the aim of ending British rule in Ireland. And the subsequent growing threat to 
introduce conscription in Ireland contributed to turning such sympathy into growing 
militant resistance. In April 1918 there was a huge upsurge of working class activity 
when the Irish Trades Union Congress organised a token but nevertheless successful 
one-day general strike on the conscription issue. Flushed with the success of the 
strike and inspired by news of revolution in Russia, there was a steady rise of 
industrial protest that not only brought a further phenomenal spurt of growth for the 
ITGWU but also further encouraged the momentum of the national movement, 
eventually leading to Britain’s humiliating retreat from most of Ireland.25
 
 
Thus, in both Spain and Ireland the syndicalist movements mounted 
opposition to the war, with Spain’s neutrality and Ireland’s colonial status providing 
the (relatively favourable) context within which this took place. Such a stance had 
real, albeit limited and varying, degrees of success in attracting support inside the 
working class movement. But in both countries the syndicalists’ overall wartime 
growth in numbers and influence occurred primarily because they were able to be 
both beneficiaries of, and contributors to, the wartime industrial struggles and 
broader political issues (beyond the question of the war) that arose. By contrast, in 
France and Italy the situation was much more problematic. 
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France and Italy: internal schisms, patriotism versus internationalism   
 
In France, in the face of the immediate threat of military defeat by Germany, the 
syndicalist movement’s professed internationalism spectacularly collapsed. In fact, 
the CGT can only plausibly be seen as a revolutionary syndicalist body from its 
inception in 1902 until the outbreak of the war. There had always been other 
important forces inside the organisation apart from the anti-war revolutionary 
tendency, notably the pro-war reformists. With the outbreak of war the latter gained 
the ascendancy and effectively became recruiting agents for the imperialist conflict. 
As a result of their early elaboration of syndicalist philosophy, their national 
prominence and their broader influence on the European syndicalist movement 
generally, the collapse of the French CGT was of major significance. 
 
Even though the internationalist principles of the CGT were swept away 
overnight in August 1914 they had made important prior efforts to avert the coming 
war despite growing government repression. Thus, true to syndicalist doctrine the 
CGT had campaigned vigorously against patriotism. The bourgeoisie was viewed as 
relying upon the patriotic sentiments of the workers to distract them from their 
fundamental economic conflict with capital and to bind them more fully to the 
defence of bourgeois interests; the real division was not between nations but 
between the exploited and exploiters. The CGT’s 1908 Marseille Congress had 
recalled the formula of the First International: ‘The workers have no fatherland!’.26
 
 In 
place of national patriotism, they advocated international working class solidarity. 
Such a viewpoint naturally led to a campaign of opposition to the threat of 
war. In 1908 the CGT had openly threatened that any declaration of war should be 
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met with a revolutionary general strike, although significantly this resolution was 
careful to commit the confederation to no more than propaganda and to specify that 
the strike should be international. Nonetheless, in 1910, when the delegates of the 
Second International had agreed to turn over the responsibility of deciding anti-war 
tactics to a specially created bureau, 20,000 CGT supporters turned out at the 
congress of Toulouse to protest against war.27 In November 1912 a peace 
demonstration was staged in Paris, attracting some 60,000; and the unions called for 
a show of force in December, with a 24-hour general strike, which repeated the call 
for the international working class movement to meet the outbreak of war with a 
revolutionary general strike. Although government repression deflected some of the 
strike’s impact, about 80,000 French workers were involved in these 
demonstrations.28
 
 
Despite such revolutionary internationalist sentiments and activities important 
counter-forces were also apparent. The reformists inside the CGT (organised in some 
of the larger unions and federations) were led by a powerful leadership, who 
represented a sizeable, albeit initially minority, body of opinion within the 
confederation. While they were committed to practical activism and strikes to win 
material improvements in workers’ conditions, they rejected what they considered to 
be the more violent forms of direct action, such as sabotage and the general strike, 
particularly against the backcloth of the hostility of employers (who financed ‘yellow’ 
unions, imported ‘blacklegs’ and hired gunmen to intimidate strikers and pickets) and 
the Republican state machine (which utilised troops to ruthlessly crush the 1909 
postal workers’ and 1910 railway workers’ strikes). Government concern at CGT anti-
war campaigning was reflected in the spring and summer of 1913, by police raids of 
union headquarters and of the homes of hundreds of union members, with jail 
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sentences imposed on a number of the principal syndicalist leaders (including 
Griffuelhes, Pouget, Yvetot).  
 
In the context of such strike defeats and state repression, the incoming CGT 
leadership from 1912 onwards, under its new general secretary Leon Jouhaux, began 
to retreat from ‘direct action’ tactics towards a more pragmatic reformist approach. 
The growing war threat also encouraged the CGT leaders to a reluctant acceptance of 
the need to co-operate with reformist Socialist Party politicians.29
 
 
Once war was declared and conscription into the French armed forces 
announced, a wave of patriotism, a deep seated willingness to defend the Republic 
against external aggression swept the French labour movement and carried almost 
the whole of the CGT (and the Socialist Party) before it. The CGT’s independent 
stance collapsed and a number of its more militant leaders, as well as Jouhaux, 
actively participated in the war effort. The abandonment of internationalist principles 
by most socialist parties of the Second International, and their active collaboration 
with respective national governments, helped to open the floodgates. Yet the speed 
with which the most ardent French syndicalists (both reformist and revolutionary) 
became recruiting agents for the imperialist conflict was astonishing. For some it 
may have been fear of the consequences that led them to capitulate, with the 
prospect of illegality, persecution and prison; but for many the popular support for 
the war, a sense of patriotism and a genuine fear of the Germans appears to have 
been enough to send them to the front.30 An editorial in La Bataille syndicaliste 
argued that in the face of German militarism the democratic and republican 
traditions of France needed to be safeguarded. France, as Jouhaux repeatedly made 
clear, was fighting not a war of conquest but a war of defence against German 
 - 16 -  
imperialism and despotism; it was a war for civilisation, for progress and liberty 
against barbarism, a war of revolution and not reaction, truly in the ‘revolutionary 
tradition’ of 1792.31
 
  
On 4 August the president of the Republic urged all citizens to commit 
themselves to a union sacrée (‘sacred union’) in defence of France, a union that the 
CGT (and Socialist Party) willingly agreed upheld for the duration. This involved 
support for a no-strike pledge and a programme of compulsory arbitration, with the 
CGT serving on various mixed commissions and participating in several inter-allied 
conferences, and Jouhaux becoming a ‘commissioner of the nation’. In the process 
most union members of military age were called up without resistance. From 
350,000 adherents in 1913, CGT membership collapsed in the face of military 
mobilisation to a mere 49,000 dues-payers by 1915, with the CGT becoming a 
‘skeletal’ organisation. It was not until 1916-17 that membership began to revive to 
reach pre-war levels, and then doubled to just fewer than 600,000 by the end of the 
war.32
 
 
In spite of the crisis of French syndicalism there emerged a tiny 
internationalist and anti-war minority within the CGT. In December 1914 Pierre 
Monatte, the leader of the new generation of revolutionary syndicalists that had 
grown up around the paper La Vie Ouvrière, publicly resigned from the CGT 
executive committee in protest at the leadership’s refusal to support a peace 
conference organised by the Scandinavian socialist parties. By the second year of the 
war, the opposition to the CGT had won over the powerful metal workers’ union led 
by Alphonse Merrheim, who made speeches insisting ‘their war is not our war’.33 A 
group of minoritaires formed into a Comité Défense Syndicaliste (CDS) and 
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condemned the CGT majority for its collaboration with the government (and after 
1917 for its alleged timidity in supporting the Russian Revolution). In September 
1915 Merrheim, accompanied by Albert Bourderon, head of the coopers’ union, 
attended the conference of anti-war socialists held at Zimmerwald in Switzerland. 
Ultimately this group, along with others on the revolutionary wing formed the 
nucleus of an internationalist and anti-war minority movement within the CGT, albeit 
marginalised during the early stages of the war.34
 
 
An immediate problem faced by those opposed to the war was how best to 
organise their dissent, a job made especially difficult due to the limited means at 
their disposal, the general dislocation of the labour movement, and the government’s 
policy of where possible dispatching militants to the front. For example, when 
Monatte was called up into the army he faced the difficult decision of whether to 
disobey orders and face summary execution, a dilemma resolved only by the advice 
of his friends that such action would be a pointless exercise. In these almost 
impossible circumstances the capacity to sustain an anti-war campaign was limited.35
 
 
However, the catastrophic bloodletting of the years 1914-18, combined with 
the impact of the Russian Revolution, helped transform the situation more favourably 
during the last eighteen months of the war. The war mobilised 8 million French 
workers, one-sixth of the population of France, and in the four years of war 4.5 
million were wounded and over 1.3 million killed. Widespread army mutinies in May-
June 1917 threatened the whole front with collapse. In September of that year the 
socialists, under rising pressure from below, withdrew from the Cabinet, and by July 
1918 the previous ‘minority’ assumed control of the Socialist Party on the platform of 
a negotiated peace.  
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Above all the strike wave of 1917-18 suggested the union sacrée consensus 
wore thin. Deteriorating working conditions, rising prices, profiteering and war 
weariness, all combined to reduce morale and encouraged growing numbers of 
workers to lend an ear to ‘pacifist and Bolshevik’ doctrines. In May-June 1918 there 
was a 200,000-strong metalworkers’ strike, in which CDS militants played a key role 
channelling beyond bread-and-butter issues into an anti-war protest, although their 
influence was defused by the arrest of strike leaders and transfer of a few hundred 
mobilisés to the trenches.36
 
 The immediate post-war years led to an increasing 
polarisation within the CGT between a reformist majority and a revolutionary 
minority, with the latter receiving a marked accession of strength from the Russian 
Revolution and the dangerously high social tensions that the war had generated. The 
internationalists split away to form the Confédération générale du travail (CGTU), a 
body which eventually became allied to communism. 
In Italy, the outbreak of war also created turmoil (albeit on a much less 
significant scale than in France) within the 100,000-strong Unione Sindacale Italiana 
(USI), the largest syndicalist organisation outside of France. The Italian government, 
which had been in alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, had initially declared 
its neutrality. But after ten months Italy finally entered the war in May 1915, joining 
the Anglo-French-Russian alliance. It was a deeply unpopular decision that was 
opposed by parliament, the Catholic Church, the Socialist Party and its trade union 
confederation. The Socialists became the largest political movement in a belligerent 
state to refuse to endorse the national war effort. As part of this process, the USI 
also immediately avowed opposition to war with its central committee urging on 8 
August 1914 that if the government abandoned its neutrality all workers should 
respond with an insurrectionary general strike.37 
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But although the bulk of the USI remained firm in their anti-militarist and 
internationalist stance, a number of syndicalist leaders, including Alceste DeAmbris, 
Tullio Masoitto and Michele Bianchi, decided to support republican France against the 
absolute monarchies of Germany and Austria and to call for Italian intervention on 
the side of the Allied Powers.38 Such figures, influenced by the republican nationalist 
tradition of Mazzini and the Freemasons, had witnessed the French CGT support the 
union sacrée and concluded that if their parent syndicalist organisation was in favour 
of protecting ‘democracy” against the encroachment of the ‘Hun’, how could the 
Italian syndicalists do anything but follow their lead?39 DeAmbris, the fabled 
syndicalist leader, threw out the challenge: ‘Friends, I ask you a question: What will 
we do when western civilisation is threatened by the suffocating imperialism of 
Germany and only our intervention can save it? I leave the answer to you’.40 He said 
the greatest menace to the revolutionary cause was not a war but rather the threat 
of a German victory. Such a victory, he felt, would destroy the proletarian movement 
and leave the workers in the clutches of German exploiters.41 Thus, the pro-war 
‘interventionists’ asserted that while the syndicalists were anti-militarist they were 
not pacifist and that the war would provide the opportunity for a revolution that 
would destroy the liberal political system and the monarchy.42
 
 
By contrast, the anarchist wing of the Italian syndicalist movement, led by 
Armando Borghi, demanded that the USI adhere to its internationalism. For Borghi 
there was no compromise with pacifism, it meant a total anti-war stance without 
regard for the Italian nation or any other nation. And in September 1914 the USI 
executive voted to expel DeAmbris and his followers. Even so the Parma Chamber of 
Labour, the largest section of the USI, voted to follow them on the path of 
intervention, with the Rome and Genoa Chambers of Labour (in which syndicalists 
were prominent) and the Maritime Union (an independent union) quickly joining 
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them. And the Unione Sindacale Milanese, the fourth largest section of the USI), also 
broke with the Milan Chamber of Labour and voted to back the interventionists. After 
this demonstration of support, DeAmbris and his followers seized control of the 
official records, financial statements and membership lists of the USI, and quickly 
converted L’Internazionale, the principal newspaper of the Italian syndicalist 
movement, into a pro-interventionist organ.43
 
 Overall, they succeeded in taking 
almost one-third of the USI’s membership, some 30,000 out of 100,000. Whilst the 
group was too small to be effective on a national scale, it was large enough to 
greatly limit the effectiveness of the USI, even though the bulk of Italian syndicalists 
confirmed their anti-militarism and internationalism.  
In response to the interventionists, the USI executive selected Bologna as the 
union’s new headquarters and appointed Borghi as secretary general, with Borghi 
attempting to rebuild the Unione by launching an anti-war propaganda offensive via 
a new official journal launched in the spring of 1915, the internationalist Guerra di 
Classe. Nonetheless, Edmondo Rossoni, a long time syndicalist who had participated 
in the 1908 Parma general strike, wrote from the United States to express his 
support for DeAmbris,44 and the editor of the Socialist Party’s daily paper (L’Avanti!), 
Benito Mussolini, also began to write in favour of intervention. DeAmbris proceeded 
to establish hard-line groups, labelled Fasci rivoluzionari d’azione (Fasci), which 
increasingly violently attacked anti-war demonstrations. Meanwhile, when Borghi 
rejected a government’s statement that impending Italian participation in the war 
should end the class struggle he was jailed for anti-patriotic remarks, and later 
placed under house arrest. The combination of such interventionist attacks and 
government repression forced the USI to move its headquarters once again, this 
time to Piacenza, with their support dwindling as they battled for the next six months 
in an effort to keep Italy out of the war. 
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Borghi’s attempt to rebuild the USI was further compounded by the political 
division that existed inside the Italian labour movement more generally. Two days 
before Italy entered the war Enrico Melabandri wrote a long article in Guerra di 
Classe, condemning the idea of unity with the Socialist Party because the latter’s 
pacifism did not have a revolutionary aim and would result in nothing more than 
support for the existing state structure.45 Both the Socialist Party and its union 
confederation had declared themselves to be neutralist, adopting the formula of ‘né 
aderire, né sabotare’ - refusing to either support the war or sabotage it (for fear 
disruption would only aid the enemy’s ruling class). As a result they refused to work 
directly with the USI, but likewise the USI was not prepared to work with the 
Socialist Party, even after the latter had threatened to call a general strike if Italy did 
not remain neutral. The USI could not accept the fact that the Socialist Party would 
have political control in calling such protest action, since this would amount to a 
repudiation of their past stance against reformism. Thus, almost from the war’s 
inception, the USI found itself shut off from the main segment of the neutralist 
movement. Such isolation inevitably weakened its position, already undermined by 
the internal split with the interventionists.46
 
 
However, while the internal schism was a crucial factor in the decline of the 
USI membership in 1915-16, the war itself was prove more decisive in affecting the 
syndicalists’ longer-term fortunes. To increase production during the war years the 
government mobilised the Italian working class en masse, with strikes and agitation 
forbidden, under the threat of severe punishment; but it also established tripartite 
industrial commissions to settle industrial disputes on which the socialist-led union 
confederation was invited to elect representatives, thereby enhancing the latter’s 
role and helping to lure thousands of workers away from the USI. What activity the 
Unione undertook tended initially to focus more on its own internal structures, such 
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as mounting opposition to the pro-interventionist Parma Chamber of Labour, than 
with encouraging the working class to fight for immediate improvements in wages 
and conditions. But if like other syndicalist organisations, the total membership of 
the USI declined considerably under the initial impact of the war, the organisation 
could still claim 48,000 members by the end of 1917.47
 
  
As the war progressed it squeezed the Italian economy hard, leading to bread 
shortages. Strikes broke out over wages, there were large anti-war demonstrations, 
and in August 1917 a spontaneous insurrectionary general strike erupted in Turin 
inspired by news of the February revolution in Russia. Barricades were thrown up in 
working class quarters of the city, with USI activists and anarchists helping to 
organise defence against attack from government troops. The rising lasted four days 
before being crushed, with 50 workers killed, and several hundred wounded and 
arrested. And then in February 1918 Borghi and other leaders of the USI met with 
leading left-wing members of the Socialist Party (including Serrati) who rejected the 
official neutralist position, and agreed to jointly advocate direct action against the 
war effort. They envisaged the establishment of local anti-war organisations that 
would campaign to convince soldiers that continued fighting was senseless; ands a 
plan was developed to seize arms from the munitions depots amidst simultaneous 
strikes in all armaments factories across northern Italy. But the government, 
informed of the plot, quickly moved to check the anti-war group, and imprisoned 
Borghi for attempting to foment revolution. 
 
Despite these apparent setbacks the economic strain of the war in Italy 
reached its height in 1918. As the cost of living increased and purchasing power 
plummeted, more and more workers responded by beginning to organise to defend 
themselves. For many the message of the Bolshevik revolution - immediate peace - 
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appeared to offer the most compelling solution, and following the October revolution 
some 20,000 workers joined the USI, drawn in part by Borghi’s message that the 
Italians should ‘Do as they did in Russia’. As a result, in the final phase of the war 
and the immediate post-war period the USI expanded rapidly; by the end of 1919 it 
had enrolled 305,000 members and was 300 per cent larger in 1919 than it had been 
in 1914 (although the socialist union confederation exceeded this rate of 
expansion).48
 
 
The aftermath of war further polarised politics in Italy. On the one hand, 
workers’ revolutionary militancy exploded in the “Bienno Rosso” (“Two Red Years”) of 
1919 and 1920, when huge strikes led to a wave of factory occupations. On the 
other hand, the breakaway interventionists also took advantage of the situation to 
mobilise growing support around the patriotic idea of ‘national syndicalism’. And with 
the defeat of the factory occupations, there was the rise of a mass fascist movement, 
culminating in its seizure of power under Mussolini’s leadership in 1922 and the 
subsequent complete demise of the USI.49
 
 
If in neutral Spain and colonial Ireland syndicalist movements retained their 
opposition to war and were beneficiaries of related industrial and political protest, in 
both belligerent France and Italy (two of the most important European countries), 
syndicalist movements were bedevilled by internal schisms and external repression 
that undermined the effectiveness of those elements that attempted to hold aloft 
their internationalism and connect it to industrial protest, although significant gains 
were nonetheless eventually achieved. By further contrast, in America and Britain, 
while syndicalists ideologically held firm to an anti-war position, their attempt to 
translate this into practical activity suffered from some strategic and tactical 
dilemmas.  
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America and Britain: dilemma of concretising opposition 
 
In America, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) denounced the war on the 
basis that it was a purely capitalist struggle for economic leverage that no worker 
should support. A leaflet prepared by one Wobbly (as IWW members were 
colloquially known) summarised their attitude sharply: ‘General Sherman said “War 
is Hell!” Don’t go to Hell in order to give the capitalists a bigger slice of heaven’.50 
Neither the outbreak of the war in Europe nor the subsequent intervention of the 
United States in the spring of 1917 caused the IWW to change their approach. 
Wobblies advised American workers to remain at home in order to fight the bosses in 
the only war worthwhile: the class war. Bill Haywood, one of the IWW’s most 
influential leaders, told a protest meeting: ‘It is better to be a traitor to your country 
than to your class. Let the bankers, the rentiers and the dividend-takers go to 
Sherman’s Hell’.51  And the IWW proposed, in the words of the editor of its paper 
Solidarity: ‘to get on the job of organising the working class to take over the 
industries […] and to stop all future capitalist aggression that leads to war and other 
forms of barbarism’.52
 
 
Paradoxically, unlike elsewhere, the outbreak of war in Europe initially 
provided the occasion and opportunity for the IWW to flourish. Against the 
background of a tight labour market and an economy in which prices rose more 
quickly than wages, there was an increase in labour unrest. Even by the time the 
United States had itself become a belligerent in the war, industrial struggles 
multiplied, enabling the IWW to expand its membership massively as they combined 
opposition to the war with a successful organising campaign in the copper mining 
industry of Montana and Arizona and the lumber industry of the Northwest. For 
example, in July 1917 25,000 hard-rock miners in Arizona took strike action under 
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IWW leadership, paralysing production of copper for three months. Between 1916 
and 1917 IWW membership almost doubled from 40,000 to 75,000, and by 
September 1917 they had between 125-150,000 members.53
 
  
Yet the war years also exposed the limitations in the IWW’s approach to 
politics and the state. While they were able to play a leading role as strike leaders in 
some crucial war industries - advising workers to wage the class war at home even 
while bloody military battles dragged on overseas - their syndicalist rejection of 
‘political action’ meant they did little in practice to politically oppose the war, despite 
the much less repressive political context than existed in France or Italy. Thus, they 
did not campaign to oppose the draft, to explicitly disrupt production in the 
workplace so as to prevent war materials being manufactured or transported, or 
build a broad-based national anti-war movement. Their ambiguous stance was a 
reflection of their syndicalist refusal to explicitly link industrial activity with political 
ideas and organisation. For example, when a member of the IWW wrote to Haywood 
at the national office asking for advice, first having proposed that the organisation 
declare a nation-wide general strike if Congress declared American participation in 
the European war, Haywood offered neither support nor counsel. Solidarity’s editor 
opposed strike action against the war:  
 
In case of war we want One Big Union…to come out of the conflict stronger and with 
more industrial control than previously. Why should we sacrifice working class 
interests for the sake of a few noisy and impotent parades or anti-war 
demonstrations? Let us rather get on with the job of organising the working class to 
take over the industries, war or no war, and stop all future capitalist aggression that 
leads to war and other forms of barbarism.54
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When America’s entry into the war was finally announced the national IWW 
office, under Haywood’s guidance, demanded the Wobblies play down anti-war 
propaganda and concentrate upon ‘the great work of organisation’. The most militant 
member of the IWW leadership, Frank Little, advised members to ‘stay at home and 
fight their own battles with their own enemy – the boss’. But Haywood cautioned: 
‘Keep a cool head; do not talk. A good many feel as you do but the world war is of 
small importance compared to the great class war…I am at a loss as to definite steps 
to be taken against the war’.55 When the government enacted a general conscription 
law in 1917, and the Wobblies were faced with the choice of whether or not to 
register when their draft boards beckoned, Ralph Chaplin used the pages of 
Solidarity to advise members to mark their claims for exemption ‘IWW opposed to 
war’. But he was overruled by Haywood who stressed it was a matter of individual 
conscience and choice. ‘The fight of the IWW is one of the economic field’, Haywood 
said, ‘and it is not for me, a man who could not be drafted for war, to tell others that 
they should go to war, or tell them they should not go to war’.56 In the event, 
roughly 95 per cent of eligible Wobblies registered with their draft boards and most 
of those served when called.57
 
  
The IWW was committed to continuing the class struggle as the war 
progressed, quite unlike the conservative American Federation of Labour (AFL) who 
collaborated with the government. Yet they opposed actively taking up the political 
issue of the war for fear of losing support amongst workers and providing the 
government with the pretext to use the war emergency to repress their organisation. 
Paradoxically, however much IWW-influenced strikes sought conventional labour 
goals the American state interpreted them as direct challenges to the war effort and 
the legitimacy of federal authority. And with the IWW refusing to renounce its 
commitment to revolution, the ruling class became increasingly alarmed by their 
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successes on the industrial front and began to whip up huge anti-IWW hysteria as 
the US prepared to enter the war. The Wobblies were branded as ‘German spies’ and 
became a target for ‘patriotic’ violence by local vigilantes, leading to the murder of 
IWW organisers Frank Little and Wesley Everett. Nonetheless, strikes continued and 
a broad-based anti-war movement subsequently developed which provided the 
opportunity to link workers’ economic grievances with political opposition to the war. 
Instead the IWW chose to ignore this ‘political’ anti-war movement, even though, 
ironically, the reformist-led Socialist Party began to grow in membership by adopting 
a formal anti-war stance and attracting to its revolutionary wing a new layer of 
working class activists prepared to campaign in opposition to the war. The IWW’s 
strategy made the government’s task of isolating it easier than might have been the 
case and the organisation suffered heavy state repression it was ill-prepared to 
survive. 
 
Individual states used the excuse of the war to pass criminal syndicalism laws 
making it illegal to advocate the overthrow of the state or the seizure of property, 
and in September 1917 the federal government raided the union’s national, regional 
and state headquarters, arrested over a hundred of the Wobbly leaders and put them 
on a show trial for violating the wartime sedition and espionage laws, sentencing 
many of them, including Haywood, to long prison terms. The IWW never really 
recovered from these attacks and within two years had effectively been destroyed, 
despite the dramatic increase in union militancy across the country that occurred in 
the initial post-war period.58
 
 
In Britain, the organised revolutionary syndicalist movement around Tom 
Mann’s Industrial Syndicalist Education League (ISEL) had already splintered and 
disintegrated over organisational disputes by the outbreak of the war, although a 
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number of individuals remained in prominent positions inside the trade union 
movement.59 With both the Labour Party and trade union leaders seeking to actively 
encourage collaboration with the state to suspend strikes in an ‘industrial truce’, Tom 
Mann’s articles in the Daily Herald provided powerful anti-war statements, and there 
is no evidence of any British syndicalists going over to the pro-war side. But if they 
did not support the war, neither did they play a distinctive role in explicitly 
campaigning to oppose it; in fact Mann attempted to play the role of a ‘responsible 
patriot’60 – concerned to defend the interests of labour, but also wanting to see 
Britain win the war so as to prevent the ruling class of Germany gaining ascendancy 
– calling for peace by negotiations.61
 
 
Following an initial lull in workers’ struggle, as the war progressed militancy in 
the munitions factories constituted a major problem for the British government, with 
a powerful engineering Shop Stewards’ and Workers’ Committee Movement led by a 
number of syndicalist-influenced revolutionaries, such as Willie Gallacher, Jack 
Tanner and J.T. Murphy, spearheading resistance to employers and the government. 
The shop stewards’ leaders adopted a position of opposition to the imperialist war 
and were committed to the overthrow of the state that prosecuted it. In the process, 
they led unofficial and illegal rank-and-file strikes that threatened to disrupt the flow 
of arms, irrespective of government attacks and the pro-war policies of the trade 
union and Labour Party leaders. For example, in 1916 they led a successful strike of 
12,000 Sheffield workers to prevent the conscription of an engineer in breach of the 
government’s pledge to exempt those employed on munitions work, and in May 1917 
led a national strike by 200,000 engineers against an attempt by the government to 
extend ‘dilution’ (the substitution of less skilled for skilled labour). A network of 
Workers’ Committees, representative of workshop organisation and committed to the 
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revolutionary goals of workers’ control of production and abolition of capitalism, was 
established across the country. 
 
At the same time, as in America, the shop stewards’ leaders refused to 
agitate politically against the war (albeit from a minority position). Instead they 
insisted the issue was beyond the bounds of the Workers’ Committees’ and that they 
should limit themselves to immediate shopfloor concerns related to wages and 
conditions. They adopted such a stance in the syndicalist belief that maximum unity 
to win militant action on such industrial issues was more important than the broader, 
more hotly disputed, political questions, including the war, which threatened to 
puncture such unity.62
 
 It was an approach highlighted in sharp relief by the 
publication of J.T. Murphy’s pamphlet The Workers’ Committee, the chief theoretical 
statement to emerge from the National Administrative Council of the shop stewards’ 
movement. 150,000 copies of the document were sold, an indication of its 
widespread influence.  
Significantly, despite being written in 1917 the pamphlet made absolutely no 
mention of the war and the political issues it raised. Instead, it reduced the immense 
economic and political problems that lay behind the growth of the Workers’ 
Committees to the level of industrial organisation.63 Ironically, even those shop 
stewards’ leaders who were members of revolutionary socialist parties, such as the 
British Socialist Party and the Socialist Labour Party, acted no differently. No doubt 
Murphy, Gallacher and others denounced the war at BSP and SLP meetings, but they 
made no attempt to propagate their views publicly amongst the rank-and-file in the 
factories for fear of losing support, remaining content to merely defend workers 
against the threats to their organisation brought about by the war. In effect, they 
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wore two hats, one reserved for their party activities, the other, a shop steward’s 
hat, to be worn as a representative of the rank-and-file, many of whom were, 
initially at least, pro-war.64
 
 
 Ironically, in many respects every issue workers faced and every industrial 
dispute over wages and conditions of work was inherently profoundly political, since 
they all arose directly as a result of the government’s determination to win outright 
victory in the war. As a consequence, the extreme political circumstances of the war, 
and the perceived failure of the labour leaders to defend workers in the face of an 
all-out attack by employers and the state, opened up possibilities for a class-wide 
agitation for militant trade unionism that fused immediate economic issues with a 
political challenge to the employers and the state over the war. In the event, as 
Murphy and others later acknowledged, relying simply on the industrial struggle had 
the effect of handing the political initiative to the ‘patriotic’ reformist labour 
leadership, isolating the movement to the engineering industry and limiting its 
overall potential.65
 
 Although the end of the war initially saw widespread industrial 
militancy, with the rundown of the munitions industry and subsequent heavy 
unemployment, it also brought a rapid demise of the shop stewards’ movement. 
So to recap, although they gained significant influence and were able to lead 
important workplace struggles, the syndicalists’ tradition of treating politics as 
something external to the workplace and shopfloor unrest as simply an economic 
issue in both America and Britain effectively undermined the impact of their 
internationalist opposition to the war.  
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Assessment 
 
In conclusion, Wayne Thorpe was undoubtedly justified in emphasising the distinctive 
contribution to the fight against the First World War made by revolutionary 
syndicalists in a number of European countries. Unlike the vast bulk of the leaders of 
the mainstream socialist and trade union movement, syndicalists often adopted a 
determined and internationalist stance. No doubt their commitment to working class 
self-emancipation, to revolutionary industrial struggle from below to overthrow 
capitalism rather than reform of the system from above, helps explain the difference 
in approach to the war. Such an internationalist stance contributed, along with the 
revival of workers’ combativity towards the end of the war period, to the growth in 
membership experienced by different syndicalist organisations, which enabled them 
to influence the ideas and activity of significant minority sections of the working 
class. 
 
But the evidence presented in this disaggregated study of different national 
contexts also underlines some of the limitations and dilemmas that were involved in 
the syndicalists’ approach. These included the collapse into ‘defencism’ amongst 
significant elements of two of the largest syndicalist movements in Europe, and the 
broader strategic and tactical limits of the syndicalists’ antipathy to political parties 
and subordination of the political question of the war to the industrial struggle 
manifest to a greater or lesser degree in different national contexts. Variation in 
syndicalist response from one movement to another appears to have been influenced 
by a variety of factors, including particular countries’ engagement with the war, the 
economic and political conditions in each country, and the size of respective 
syndicalist organisation, with the absorption of reformist elements within the body of 
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the CGT itself, rather than in a rival trade union centre (as elsewhere), a crucial 
factor in explaining why French syndicalism was so different. 
 
Of course, the limitations outlined above by no means undermine Thorpe’s 
substantive attempt to rescue the often overlooked syndicalist contribution from the 
condescension of many, particularly right-wing and/or official Communist or Stalinist, 
historians. But they do qualify the picture that he presented.  
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